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Sevorix technical architecture

Deterministic Security for Autonomous Workflows

Moving enforcement from the application layer to the OS kernel.

The Trade-Offs: The Latency and Bypass Tax

In the world of AI security, two major hurdles prevent enterprise adoption: accuracy and latency. Traditional AI security relies on "Sidecar Proxies" or "API Gateways." These methods introduce critical flaws:

  • The Latency Tax: Every external call must hop to a proxy, be scanned, and hop back, often adding 200–400ms to every interaction.
  • The Bypass Risk: If an agent is compromised or hallucinates a new network path, it can often bypass environment variables and route around the proxy entirely.

Sevorix eliminates these flaws by dropping enforcement into the kernel via eBPF.

Core Component: eBPF Enforcement Hooks

Sevorix uses eBPF (Extended Berkeley Packet Filter) to insert high-performance security hooks directly into the Linux kernel.

  • Runtime Interception: We intercept connect(), open(), and execve() for every process inside a Sevorix session — the agent and everything it spawns.
  • Instant Enforcement: We don't "detect and alert" — we enforce, and we enforce before the fact. The kernel suspends the calling thread at the syscall boundary and holds it there until policy answers; a denied call returns EPERM to the agent without ever having executed. Nothing is undone after the fact, because nothing ran. And the decision is local: no network round trip, no dependency on anything outside your machine.
  • The Agent Can't Replace the Guard: The shell the agent gets is not one it can swap out. sevsh is installed root-owned outside any user-writable path and bind-mounted over /bin/bash as root, after a SHA-256 check against the digest recorded at install and pinned to the exact file descriptor that gets mounted. Its network namespace has no interface but the one we hand it. Changing its own environment doesn't move either boundary.
  • Where the Floor Is: A blocked syscall is blocked everywhere — a matching deny returns EPERM before execution, on every syscall we intercept. The one documented exception is narrower, and it's about approvals, not denials: when a rule matches on a path, an approved execve() or connect() can't be made race-free, because the kernel re-reads the path when it runs the call. A compromised multithreaded process can swap it after the check. File syscalls don't carry that caveat — the supervisor performs those itself, on the exact inode it validated. We report which enforcement tier a session is actually running at rather than assuming the stronger one, and a process never launched through a Sevorix session isn't observed at all.

Each of those boundaries — what is enforced preventively, what is advisory, and what is not observed at all — is set out in full, with the conditions attached to each, in our published threat model.

Solving the Accuracy Gap: The "Jury of Rivals"

Relying on a single model for a security decision is a single point of failure. If it hallucinates or misses a malicious intent, the system fails.

Our answer is a Jury of Rivals: several frontier models from rival vendors — OpenAI, Anthropic, and Google are the built-in providers — reviewing the same action independently and in parallel. You choose the panel and the quorum; the default is majority-to-block. Each member gets its own timeout, 8 seconds by default, and a member that errors or times out counts as a block, not an abstention.

The jury sits inside the deterministic floor, never above it. It only ever sees actions the compiled policy already permits, and its only power is to take one away — it can narrow what the rulebook allows, never widen it. A hung jury doesn't open a door.

Escalation Is Off the Hot Path

Deterministic enforcement never leaves the node. Policy verdicts are made on your machine, at the kernel boundary, with no network dependency — a total loss of connectivity changes nothing about whether a denied syscall is denied. Only the ambiguous middle case escalates, and escalation is an explicit, opt-in call out to model providers you configure with your own API keys.

  • No Proxy Hop: Enforcement isn't a remote hop. The proxy is local, and it's in the path because the agent's namespace offers no other route — not because an environment variable politely points at it. The kernel is already in the path of every syscall the agent makes.
  • Escalation Is Bounded: A jury call is a network call, and it's priced like one: a per-member timeout, 8 seconds by default, and a verdict that defaults to block if the panel can't be reached.
The 'Fail-Closed' Mandate

Sevorix fails closed by default. A jury member that errors or times out is a block, a held action nobody answers is a block, and an evaluation layer that cannot be reached at all is a block. Two switches can invert that — the jury's on-error action and the hold timeout action — and both are opt-in and off by default.

Integration: Native Speed, Zero Code Changes

Sevorix is designed to be invisible to your developers.

  • No SDKs: You don't need to rewrite your agent's code. Sevorix attaches to the process at the OS level.
  • Infrastructure Agnostic: Sevorix attaches at the OS level, so it doesn't care how the agent got there — a Linux host and a Docker container are the same problem to a kernel hook.

Technical Specifications

Enforcement layerseccomp-unotify (default) · BPF LSM on opt-in
Consensus engineJury of Rivals — frontier APIs (OpenAI / Anthropic / Google)
Escalation timeout8s per member, default · block on timeout
Latency budget< 5ms block · ~5ms pass-through

Evaluate the enforcement path.

The source is open, the binary runs on your own hardware, and our engineers will walk the architecture with you.