Sevorix vs. status quo

How Sevorix Compares to Guardrails, Gateways, Proxies, and Sandboxes

Stop playing whack-a-mole with probabilistic security. Secure the ground truth.

The Enforcement Matrix

Traditional security tools were designed for human-led traffic and static code. They are "outside-in" solutions. Sevorix is an "inside-out" infrastructure play that moves the security boundary from the application layer to the OS kernel.

Capability	Prompt guardrails	API Gateways / WAFs	Network Proxies	eBPF runtime security (Falco, Tetragon)	Sandboxes (gVisor, Firecracker)	Sevorix
Enforcement Layer	Application (L7)	Cloud / Perimeter	Network (L4)	Kernel (tracepoints / BPF LSM)	Hypervisor / kernel ABI	Kernel (seccomp hold + opt-in BPF LSM)
Logic Model	Probabilistic	Pattern-based	Capability-based	Deterministic	Isolation boundary	Deterministic
Visibility	Prompt/Text only	Perimeter Traffic	Proxied Traffic only	Full syscalls, host-wide	Opaque inside the box	Full syscalls, per session
Latency Tax	400ms+ (LLM check)	100ms+ (Cloud hop)	200ms+ (Proxy hop)	In-kernel	Syscall overhead	~5ms (In-kernel)
Bypass Resistance	Low (Jailbreakable)	Medium (DNS/SSRF)	Medium (Out-of-band)	High	High (by design)	High (kernel hold + root-owned shell)
Response to a violation	Refuses the prompt	Rejects the request	Drops the connection	Alert (Falco) / kill (Tetragon)	The box is the decision	Refuse, or hold for a human
Human in the loop	No	No	No	No — automated verdict	No	Yes — Yellow Lane review
Scope of policy	Per prompt	Per endpoint	Per connection	Host / cluster-wide	Per box	Per agent session and role

Prompt Guardrails: The Probabilistic Failure

Most "AI Firewalls" are just another LLM asking the agent to behave.

The Status Quo: You write a system prompt telling the agent "don't exfiltrate data."
The Failure: Prompt injection and semantic jailbreaks can bypass these instructions. You are asking a probabilistic system to police itself.
The Sevorix Win: We don't care what the agent "intends." Intent is a sentence; a syscall is an event. The kernel suspends the calling thread and holds it there until the policy engine answers — an unauthorized connect() returns EPERM having never executed, no matter how convincingly the agent argued for it.

L7 Gateways & Proxies: The Perimeter Blindspot

Enterprise gateways look for malicious patterns in inbound web traffic.

The Status Quo: You block known malicious IPs at the edge.
The Failure: These tools are blind to local system calls. If an agent hallucinates a path to your local .ssh/ folder or tries to execute a rogue binary, the perimeter gateway never sees the attempt.
The Sevorix Win: We watch the machine behavior. By monitoring open() and execve() syscalls, we block local data theft before it ever reaches the network.

Network Proxies: The Cooperation Assumption

Tools like Pipelock provide excellent content scanning but rely on the agent being "forced" to use the proxy.

The Status Quo: You set a HTTPS_PROXY environment variable.
The Failure: Proxies can be bypassed if an agent modifies its own environment or uses non-standard protocols. Additionally, every request takes a 200–400ms latency hit.
The Sevorix Win: Sevorix does run a local proxy — but the agent isn't asked to cooperate with it. It runs inside its own network namespace whose only route out is that proxy, so unsetting HTTPS_PROXY doesn't open an alternate path; it just removes the one that worked. The shell is a root-owned binary bind-mounted into place, so it can't be swapped either.

eBPF Runtime Security: Falco and Tetragon

The established kernel-level tools. If you already run one, this is the honest comparison.

The Status Quo: Falco watches syscalls host-wide and raises an alert when a rule matches. Tetragon goes further and enforces in the kernel — it can override a call's return value or SIGKILL the process outright. Both are mature CNCF projects, and for host-wide runtime visibility they cover more ground than we do.
The Failure: It is a fit problem, not a defect. Falco's answer to a violation is an alert, and an alert arrives after the call ran; turning it into enforcement means bolting on a separate response engine that reacts to the event. Tetragon does block, though its own documentation notes that a SIGKILL "does not always stop the operation being performed by the process." What neither has is a third answer for the case an agent produces constantly — an action that is neither clearly fine nor clearly fatal, and that a person should look at. And their policy is written for a host or a cluster, not for this agent, in this role, right now.
The Sevorix Win: Not a better block — a third lane. Our own eBPF tracepoints are exactly as observational as Falco's; the kernel ignores what a tracepoint returns. Enforcement is a seccomp-unotify supervisor that suspends the calling thread at the syscall boundary and returns EPERM before the call executes, with BPF LSM hooks as an opt-in second tier. On a Yellow-Lane action the action is held rather than resolved: the agent's process tree is frozen and an operator decides, and if that containment can't be confirmed the action is refused by default. Policy is scoped to a registered session and its role. The trade is real and worth stating — we only see what was launched through a Sevorix session, so a process started outside one is not observed at all. That host-wide floor is what Falco gives you and we do not.

Sandboxes and Isolation: gVisor, Firecracker, and "give it nothing"

The other reasonable answer: put the agent in a box and hand it no credentials.

The Status Quo: Run the agent inside a microVM or a hardened container — gVisor, Firecracker, a microVM-per-agent product, or just Docker with no network and no secrets.
The Failure: It answers a different question. Isolation decides where the agent runs, not which actions it may take; inside the box there is no per-action policy and nothing to review. An agent holding your repository and a valid token can do anything that repository and token allow, and the box will not object. The no-credentials configuration is genuinely safe and is also the one nobody ships, because an agent worth running needs real access.
The Sevorix Win: Complementary, not competing. Sevorix runs inside your container or microVM — a Linux host and a Docker container are the same problem to a syscall hook — and supplies the per-action decision the box has no way to express. Keep the isolation boundary; add a policy that can tell one execve() from another.

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